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ABSTRACT
Mobile devices with rich features can record videos, traffic parame-
ters or air quality readings along user trajectories. Although such
data may be valuable, users are seldom rewarded for collecting them.
Emerging digital marketplaces allow owners to advertise their data
to interested buyers. We focus on geo-marketplaces, where buyers
search data based on geo-tags. Such marketplaces present signifi-
cant challenges. First, if owners upload data with revealed geo-tags,
they expose themselves to serious privacy risks. Second, owners
must be accountable for advertised data, and must not be allowed
to subsequently alter geo-tags. Third, such a system may be vulner-
able to intensive spam activities, where dishonest owners flood the
system with fake advertisements. We propose a geo-marketplace
that addresses all these concerns. We employ searchable encryption,
digital commitments, and blockchain to protect the location privacy
of owners while at the same time incorporating accountability and
spam-resilience mechanisms. We implement a prototype with two
alternative designs that obtain distinct trade-offs between trust as-
sumptions and performance. Our experiments on real location data
show that one can achieve the above design goals with practical
performance and reasonable financial overhead.
CCS CONCEPTS
• Security and privacy → Domain-specific security and pri-
vacy architectures.
KEYWORDS
location privacy, searchable encryption, blockchain
1 INTRODUCTION
The mobile computing landscape is witnessing an unprecedented
number of devices that can acquire geo-tagged data, e.g., mobile
phones, wearable sensors, in-vehicle dashcams, and IoT sensors.
These devices, owned by a diverse set of entities, can collect large
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amounts of data such as images, videos, movement parameters, or
environmental measurements. The datamay be useful to third-party
entities interested in gathering information from a certain location.
For example, journalists maywant to gather images around an event
of interest for their newspaper; law enforcement may seek images
taken soon before or after a crime occurred; and city authorities
may be interested in travel patterns during heavy traffic.
Currently, data collected by individuals are often discarded or
archived, due to lack of storage space. Even when data are shared,
owners are seldom rewarded for their contributions. An emerging
trend is to create data marketplaces where owners advertise their
data objects to potential buyers. We emphasize that marketplaces
differ from crowdsourcing services such as Amazon Mechanical
Turk. In crowdsourcing, data are owned by the service provider,
and the user receives a small reward for a task, e.g., a few cents for
classifying an image. In contrast, with data marketplaces users own
the data and advertise them to buyers. If an object is appealing (e.g.,
a photo purchased by a newspaper), the buyer may pay a higher
price (in the order of tens of dollars or more), resulting in different
cost and scalability considerations.
Geo-marketplaces, where entities trade geo-tagged data objects,
raise unique concerns. Publishing geo-tags in clear reveals owners’
whereabouts, which may lead to serious privacy breaches such as
leakage of one’s health status or political orientation. In addition,
onemust also protect the interests of buyers, and ensure they receive
data objects satisfying their spatial requirements. Owners must
be held accountable for their advertised data and not be able to
change the geo-tag of an object after its initial advertisement. This
can prevent situations where owners change geo-tags to reflect
ongoing trends in buyers’ interest. For example, when a certain high-
profile event occurs at a location, dishonest owners may attempt
to change their geo-tags closer to that location in order to sell their
images at higher prices. Furthermore, the system must provide
strong disincentives to prevent spam behavior, where dishonest
participants flood the system with fake advertisements.
We propose a geo-marketplace with three key features:
Privacy.We adapt state-of-the-art searchable encryption (SE) tech-
niques to protect locations, and we perform matching between
buyer interests and advertised objects on encrypted geo-tags.
Accountability. To hold owners accountable for their advertise-
ments, we use cryptographic commitments and blockchain technol-
ogy. We store a compact digital commitment on the blockchain to
prevent owners from altering object geo-tags after publication.
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Spam-Resilience.Weemploy the use of a public blockchain, where
writing to the ledger requires a transaction fee. We control the cost
such that legitimate users only pay negligible fees relative to the
value of their objects, whereas dishonest users who flood the system
with fake advertisements are strongly disincentivized.
In our design, the data owner generates a metadata item which
includes the object’s geo-tag. The bulk data (e.g., image or video), is
either stored by the owner (e.g., flash drive), or encrypted with con-
ventional encryption at a bulk storage service, such as Swarm [11]
or InterPlanet File System [10]. The low-footprint geo-tag metadata
is encrypted using SE. The owner then creates a digital commit-
ment of the metadata and stores it on the blockchain. Commitments
can be stored either individually, or batched together for better
blockchain efficiency and cost.
Buyers search objects based on geo-tags by querying the en-
crypted metadata. They must first obtain a search token that allows
them to identify encrypted objects that match their spatial range
query. Since processing on encrypted data is computationally ex-
pensive, if the buyers decide to use other services to perform the
task, they often need to pay for the search token and its processing.
In our system model, different strategies are investigated to ensure
that the performance and financial cost of the search process are
practical. It is important to remark that the encrypted search re-
veals neither the exact whereabouts of the objects, nor the owner’s
identity. The buyer learns only pseudonymous owner identifiers
for matching objects, e.g., a blockchain public key, through which
the transaction can be anonymously completed. Once matching
objects are identified, the owner and buyer enter a smart contract
through the blockchain. As a result, the owner receives payment,
and the buyer receives the actual data objects, and the correspond-
ing conventional decryption keys.
Achieving the three aforementioned objectives is challenging.
First, SE techniques incur significant overhead compared to the
search on plaintexts, especially with asymmetric encryption. Thus,
carefully designing data and query encodings is essential to obtain
efficient solutions that can be scaled to large datasets. Second, the
cost of privacy and accountability should not be too high; otherwise,
it may interfere with the financial operation of the marketplace,
resulting in prohibitive costs. An acceptable financial cost should
only account for a small percentage of the transaction value.
Our specific contributions include:
• We propose a novel architecture for a geo-marketplace that
achieves privacy, accountability, and spam resilience by com-
bining searchable encryption, digital commitments, and block-
chain. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first work
aiming to accomplish these objectives.
• We propose protocols for owner-buyer matching with both
symmetric and asymmetric SE. These approaches offer an
interesting trade-off between trust assumptions and perfor-
mance, facilitating adoption in a wide range of scenarios.
• We develop optimization techniques to address the high
computational cost of encrypted search. We also consider
techniques to decrease the financial cost of blockchain oper-
ations by reducing the amount of on-chain storage.
• Weperform an extensive experimental evaluation tomeasure
system performance, in terms of computational overhead,
storage, and financial cost incurred.
Sec. 2 provides background information on the different compo-
nents of the system, followed by an overview of the system model
and operations workflow in Sec. 3. We present technical details in
Sec. 4 and experimental results in Sec. 5. We review related work
in Sec. 6 and conclude with directions for future research in Sec. 7.
2 BACKGROUND
Searchable Symmetric Encryption (SSE) allows a client to search
and selectively retrieve her encrypted documents outsourced to a
server. SSE was first proposed in [31] and further refined in [8, 15].
The first efficient sub-linear SSE scheme that supports Boolean
queries was proposed in [6]. Later on, [32] proposed a scheme that
achieves forward security by protecting access patterns at the time
of document addition. State-of-the-art SSE schemes are efficient,
but at the expense of some leakage in the form of access patterns.
In our system, we use the recently-proposed HXT technique [23]
which supports conjunctive keyword queries.
Let d0, . . . ,dn−1 be the client’s documents and I an inverted in-
dex that maps a keywordw to the list of document identifiers con-
tainingw . We denote the list of document identifiers that containw
as I (w). An SSE scheme consists of the following four algorithms:
1) Setup is run by the client and takes as input security parameter
k and documents d0, . . . ,dn−1. It generates two secret keys KI and
KD . It parses all the documents and forms an inverted index I that
maps to each keywordw a list of document identifiers (I (w)) that
containw . The client encrypts this index using a special encryption
algorithm specified by the particular SSE scheme and generates an
encrypted inverted index using the key KI . It also encrypts each
document di ,∀0 ≤ i < n, with conventional symmetric encryption
(e.g., AES) using the key KD and assigns it a unique identifier that
is independent of the document contents. It outputs the keys KI
and KD that are stored locally at the client and the encrypted index
that is sent to the server.
2) Token Generation, run by the client, takes as input secret key KI
and a keyword w . Using secret key KI , it creates a search token
tkw which is sent to the server.
3) Search is run by the server and uses as input the token tkw
and the encrypted index. It searches the encrypted index and re-
trieves the list of document identifiers that contain the keyword
w , namely I (w). The server retrieves the encrypted documents
dw0 , . . . ,d
w
|I (w ) |−1 using the identifiers in I (w) and sends the docu-
ments to the client.
4) Decryption is run by the client and uses the secret key KD to
decrypt the documents received from the server.
Hidden Vector Encryption (HVE) [3, 4] is an asymmetric search-
able encryption technique supporting conjunctive equality, range
and subset queries. Search on ciphertexts can be performed with
respect to a number of index attributes. HVE represents an attribute
as a bit vector (each element has value 0 or 1), and the search predi-
cate as a pattern vector where each element can be 0, 1 or ’*’ (i.e.,
wildcard value). Let l denote the HVE width, which is the bit length
of the attribute, and consequently that of the search predicate. A
predicate evaluates toTrue for a ciphertextC if the attribute vector
I used to encryptC has the same values as the pattern vector of the
predicate in all positions that are not ’*’ in the latter.
HVE is built on top of a symmetric bilinear map of composite
order [2], which is a function e : G × G→ GT such that ∀a,b ∈ G
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and ∀u,v ∈ Z it holds that e(au ,bv ) = e(a,b)uv . G and GT are
cyclic multiplicative groups of composite order n = p · q where p
and q are large primes of equal bit length. We emphasize that the
application of function e , which is called a bilinear pairing, is expen-
sive to compute, so the number of pairings must be minimized. We
denote byGp ,Gq the subgroups ofG of orders p and q, respectively.
HVE consists of the following four algorithms:
1) Setup. The private/public key pair (SK/PK) are as follows:
SK = (дq ∈ Gq , a ∈ Zp , ∀i ∈ [1..l] : ui ,hi ,wi ,д,v ∈ Gp )
PK = (дq , V = vRv , A = e(д,v)a ,
∀i ∈ [1..l] : Ui = uiRu,i , Hi = hiRh,i , Wi = wiRw,i )
with random Ru,i ,Rh,i , Rw,i ∈ Gq ,∀i ∈ [1..l] and Rv ∈ Gq
2) Encryption uses PK and takes as parameters index attribute I and
messageM ∈ GT . The following random elements are generated:
Z ,Zi,1,Zi,2 ∈ Gq and s ∈ Zn . The ciphertext is:
C = (C′ = MAs , C0 = V sZ ,
∀i ∈ [1..l] : Ci,1 = (U Iii Hi )sZi,1, Ci,2 =W si Zi,2)
Token Generation.Using SK , and given a search predicate encoded as
pattern vector I∗, the TA generates a search tokenTK as follows: let
J be the set of all indices i where I∗[i] , ∗. TA randomly generates
ri,1 and ri,2 ∈ Zp ,∀i ∈ J . Then
TK = (I∗,K0 = дa
∏
i ∈J
(uI∗[i]i hi )ri,1w
ri,2
i ,
∀i ∈ [1..l] : Ki,1 = vri ,1, Ki,2 = vri ,2)
Query is executed at the server, and evaluates if the predicate rep-
resented by TK holds for ciphertext C . The server attempts to
determine the value ofM as
M = C
′/(e(C0,K0)/
∏
i ∈J
e(Ci,1,Ki,1)e(Ci,2,Ki,2) (1)
If the index I on which C was computed satisfies TK , the value of
M is returned, otherwise a nil value ⊥ is obtained.
Vector Digital Commitments. Cryptographic commitments [29]
allow a party S to commit to a messagem by creating a commitment
CC , such that CC is binding (i.e., S cannot change the messagem)
and hiding (i.e., CC does not leak any information about m). In
this work, we use vector commitments [7], which allow party S
to commit to an ordered sequence of messages (m0, . . . ,mq−1),
such that it can later open the commitment for a specific message,
e.g., to prove thatmi is the i-th message in the sequence. Vector
commitments are space-efficient because their size is independent
of the number of committed values. A vector commitment scheme
is defined by the following four algorithms:
1) KeyGen takes as input security parameter k and size q of com-
mitted vector and outputs a public parameter pp.
2) Commit takes as input a sequence ofqmessagesV =m0, . . . ,mq−1,
the public parameter pp and outputs a commitment string CC and
an auxiliary information aux .
3) Open takes as input a messagem ∈ m0, . . . ,mq−1, a position i ,
and the auxiliary information aux and is run by the committer to
produce a proof Pi that m is the i-th message in the committed
message vector V .
4) Verify takes as input the commitment string CC , a messagem, a
position i , and the proof Pi , to verify that Pi is a valid proof that
CC was created to a sequencem0, . . . ,mq−1, wherem =mi .
Blockchain, Smart Contracts and Bulk Storage. Blockchain
was first introduced in [27] as a decentralized public ledger that
records transactions among entities without a trusted party. A
blockchain is a sequence of transaction blocks cryptographically-
linked through the hash value of the predecessor. A transaction
typically moves cryptocurrency from one account to another. An
account is defined as the public key of an entity, which provides
pseudonymity. System nodes called miners compete to create new
blocks by solving proof-of-work puzzles. The miner who finds the
puzzle solution first is rewarded with cryptocurrency.
Some blockchain platforms (e.g., Ethereum), have the ability to
execute smart contracts [34], which are sophisticated agreements
among entities that utilize transactions on the blockchain. Smart
contracts are expressed in a high-level programming language (e.g.,
Solidity) interpreted by a blockchain virtual machine. One limitation
when storing data on the blockchain is size. Due to the competitive
nature of block creation, the growth rate of the blockchain is limited.
Recently, decentralized storage systems have been proposed that
interface with the blockchain and allow large amounts of storage
(e.g., Swarm [11]). Such systems provide a distributed hash table
(DHT) interface [33] to store and retrieve data. Participating peers
receive incentives for the contributed storage.
3 SYSTEM MODEL
The central component in our design is the blockchain, and its as-
sociated on-chain operations. On-chain storage is financially expen-
sive, since write operations to the chain translate into transaction
blocks added to the ledger. We aim to minimize the amount of on-
chain storage. Only digital commitments and minimal addressing
information is stored on-chain. For all other data structures, we em-
ploy bulk storage (Swarm). Another challenging part of the system
is matching owners’ data to buyers’ requests. This process involves
search on encrypted location metadata, which is computationally
expensive, especially in the case of asymmetric searchable encryp-
tion. Searchable ciphertexts tend to be large in size compared to
corresponding plaintexts, in order to support conjunctive queries
and hide data patterns. In the case of SSE, metadata ciphertexts and
associated indexes are also placed in bulk storage.
We present evaluation metrics in Section 3.1, followed by two
alternative system designs: in Section 3.2 we present a solution
based on SSE, which achieves sub-linear search performance, thanks
to the use of an encrypted index. However, this approach requires a
trusted curator (TC), which holds the secret encryption key, and has
access to the plaintext locations of all object geo-tags. In Section 3.3,
we propose an asymmetric encryption design, where each owner
has the public key of a private/public key pair. Owners encrypt
locations using Hidden Vector Encryption (HVE). There is still need
for a trusted authority (TA) that holds the private key and generates
search tokens at runtime, but this entity does not have access to
plaintext locations. While in principle it is possible for the TA to
collude with buyers and issue numerous search tokens that may
reveal all object locations, such an attack is more difficult to stage.
We assume that the TA is non-colluding. In addition, it is possible
to use multiple TAs, so the amount of disclosure in the case of
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Figure 1: SSE-based SystemWorkflow
collusion is limited. The disadvantage of HVE is that it does not
allow the construction of an index, so a linear search is required.
3.1 Evaluation Metrics
We consider computation time, storage size and financial cost as
performance metrics. The latter is measured in Ethereum using
the concept of gas. Each on-chain transaction requires spending a
certain amount of gas to complete. The cost of one unit of gas is
linked to the Ethereum price, which is market-driven. One unit of
gas costs 1e-9 ether . At the time of writing, 1ether = $133 . Since
on-chain operations are dominated by the cost of gas, which far
exceeds the corresponding storage and computational overhead, we
exclusively use gas to measure on-chain operations. For off-chain
operations, we use computation time to evaluate the performance
of: location encryption and index generation (indexes are used
only for SSE), cryptographic commitment generation, search token
generation and token-object matching. In terms of storage cost, we
focus on ciphertext size and search token size. Commitment size is
taken into account using gas, as it is stored on-chain.
3.2 Private Geo-marketplace with SSE
We employ HXT encryption [23], the state-of-the-art in conjunc-
tive keyword search. HXT builds an index which allows sub-linear
search. Fig. 1 shows the system architecture, with three types of
entities: owners, buyers and a trusted curator (TC). TC collects plain-
text locations of all objects and builds an index with SSE-encrypted
locations. In practice, the curator role can be fulfilled by an entity
that already has an established relationship of trust with owners,
e.g., a cell operator that already has access to customer locations.
The TC has financial incentives to operate the service: it can charge
a small fee for location indexing and search token generation. The
system can have more than one curator, each serving a subset of
owners. While this reduces the amount of location exposure to a
single entity, it results in multiple indexes, which may reduce search
efficiency. In the rest of the paper, we assume a single curator.
The TC initializes the index (Step 0 in Fig. 1), assigns it a unique
index identifier (IID) and stores it in bulk storage. The IID is also
stored on the blockchain, and later used by buyers to bootstrap
the search. For example, the IID may include TC contact informa-
tion such as URI. Each data owner is represented by a pseudony-
mous identifier, e.g., public key in the blockchain system. To ad-
vertise an object, the owner randomly generates a unique object
identifier (OID) and computes a digital commitment that covers
the geo-tag and OID (Step 1). The digital commitment is stored
on the blockchain. Since the commitment is hiding, placing it on
the blockchain will not disclose the object’s location. The binding
property of commitments, combined with the unmalleable storage
property of the blockchain, guarantees that the owner can be held
accountable if it turns out that the advertised object is collected at
another location than the advertised one. Next (Step 2), the owner
submits the plaintext location along with the OID to the TC, and
uploads the bulk data (encrypted with conventional AES) to bulk
storage (Step 3) having the OID as key (recall that, the bulk storage
offers a DHT-like interface and stores key-value pairs). Then, the
curator inserts the object in the encrypted HXT index (Step 4). We
emphasize that location proofs are orthogonal to our approach, and
existing solutions [1, 5, 13, 25] can be adopted in our system.
Buyers search objects based on geo-tags. We assume buyers
specify search predicates in the form of spatial range queries. The
buyer locates the TC bootstrap information (Step 5), and contacts
the TC with the search predicate in plaintext. The TC, who holds
the master secret key of the SE instance, generates a search token to
evaluate the spatial predicate. The token is sent to the buyer (Step
6). The curator may charge the buyer a fee for each token. Flexible
pricing policies may be implemented by the curator: for instance,
tokens that cover a larger area, or that cover denser areas where
one is expected to find more objects, may be more expensive.
Next (Step 7), the actual search is performed using the HXT
index. The index is stored in distributed fashion on bulk storage, so
the search process can be completed by the buyer through repeated
interaction with the DHT interface using the IID and index pointers
as request keys. Alternatively, the buyer can employ another service
that performs the search directly on the storage nodes. The details
of this process are orthogonal to our approach, and we consider as
performance metric the total computational cost incurred by the
search, which is the same whether it is executed on the buyer’s
machine (e.g., in the case of an institutional buyer with significant
resources), or on the Swarm nodes (e.g., in the case of a private
buyer who performs the transaction using its mobile phone and
pays an additional fee for the search).
When search completes, the buyer learns the pseudo-identities of
matching owners, and decides which data object(s) to purchase. The
purchase is completed through a smart contract between the owner
and the buyer (Step 8), followingwhich the owner receives payment,
and the buyer receives the AES key used to encrypt the object in
Swarm. The buyer downloads the object (Step 9) and decrypts it
locally, at which point the transaction is finalized. If it turns out that
the data does not satisfy the advertised geospatial attributes, the
buyer can contest the transaction, and use the digital commitment
to prove that the owner is dishonest. The payment is reversed,
and additional punitive measures (e.g., reputation penalties) can be
taken against the owner. The transactions on the blockchain are
evidence of the purchase and provide accountability.
3.3 Private Geo-marketplace with HVE
Fig. 2 illustrates the system workflow when using HVE encryption.
The main difference compared to the SSE case is the absence of
the curator. Instead, there is a Trusted Authority (TA), which holds
the private (or master) key of the HVE instance and issues search
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Figure 2: HVE-based SystemWorkflow
tokens. Most of the steps remain the same, with a few exceptions.
In Step 0, instead of building an index, the TA initializes a flat file
that will contain all the encrypted object locations. In Step 2, the
owners encrypt object locations by themselves, using the public
HVE key. This reduces considerably disclosure compared to the
SSE case. The rest of the workflow remains unchanged. However,
the counter of Steps 4-8 in Fig. 2 is less by one compared to their
SSE counterparts, due to the absence of the index update step.
4 TECHNICAL APPROACH
Sec. 4.1 discussed search using SSE, whereas Sec. 4.2 focuses on
HVE. Sec. 4.3 discusses accountability and SPAM resilience.
4.1 Symmetric Encryption Search
SSE techniques [23, 32] support keyword (i.e., exact match) queries,
and conjunctions thereof, over an arbitrary domain. Our objective
is to support range queries on top of geospatial data. For simplicity,
we consider a two-dimensional (2D) space (although our results
can be easily generalized to 3D). SSE schemes assume a database of
documents, where each document is associated with a set of key-
words. In our setting, each object is a document, and its keywords
are derived based on the geo-tag of the object.
First, we discuss the case of data and range queries for a one-
dimensional (1D) domain. Consider a domain A of integers from
0 to L − 1, where L is a power of 2 (i.e., the domain of (logL)-bit
integers). Even though spatial coordinates are real numbers, we can
represent them using an integer-valued domainwith good precision.
We construct a full binary tree over domain A, where the value in
each node represents a domain range. Each node can be uniquely
identified using the path leading to it from the root node. Along
that path, left branches are labeled with 0 and right branches with 1.
A node identifier (id) is the unique string that concatenates all edge
labels on the path from the root to that node. Figure 3 shows the
resulting binary tree for a 3-bit domain A = [0, . . . , 7]. For example,
the node id of N2,3 in Fig. 3 is "01".
We adopt a domain encoding called best range cover (BRC) [18].
Given a range r , BRC selects the minimal set of nodes that cover r .
The ids of the nodes in this set represent the keywords associated to
r . For example, the range [2, 7] is minimally covered by nodes N2,3
and N4,7 (shown shaded in Fig. 3), with node ids (i.e., keywords)
"01" and "1"; whereas the range [2, 6] is minimally covered by nodes
N2,3,N4,5 and N6, with node ids "01", "10" and "110". The ranges
covering a leaf node can be identified by traversing the tree upward
from that leaf node. Given a data value, its keywords are represented
by the node ids from the upward traversal that starts at the leaf
node representing the value’s binary representation. For instance,
leaf node N3 is covered by nodes N3, N2,3, N0,3, and N0,7 (encircled
in Fig. 3), with node ids "011", "01", "0" and "∅" as keywords (the
root node is encoded as ∅ since its path has length 0).
For a 2D domain, a separate binary tree is constructed for each
dimension, and the node ids are prefixed with "x" and "y", respec-
tively, to distinguish values in each coordinate. For example, the
ids of node N x2,3 and N
y
2,3 on the tree of Ox and Oy are represented
as "x01" and "y01", respectively. Each location is a single cell in the
grid of size L × L covering the entire geospatial domain. For an
object positioned at cell (i, j) corresponding to leaf nodes N xi ,N
y
j
in their respective domain trees, the union of node ids covering
N xi ,N
y
j is used as the keyword set for the object. The id of the root
is omitted since it appears in every object. The total number of
keywords of each object is 2 logL. For instance, the keyword set
of an object in cell (3, 4) contains 2 log 8 = 6 nodes: N x3 , N x2,3, N x0,3,
N
y
4 , N
y
4,5, N
y
4,7, with labels "x011", "x01", "x0", "y100", "y10", "y1".
A range query in the 2D domain is a cross join of node ids in each
dimension. For example, the 2D range query defined by x ∈ [2, 7]
and y ∈ [2, 6] is expressed as (N x2,3 ∧ N
y
2,3) ∨ (N x2,3 ∧ N
y
2,3) ∨ · · · ∨
(N x2,7 ∧ N
y
6 ) or in our specific encoding ("x01" ∧ "y01") ∨ ("x01" ∧
"y10") ∨ · · · ∨ ("x1" ∧ "y110"). Each term in the expression is a
conjunctive keyword query, which is directly supported by HXT.
HXT query time depends on the number of documents containing
the first keyword [23]. We sort the keywords in a query so that the
node closest to the leaf level is in the first position, since that node
covers a smaller range, hence query cost is decreased.
The trusted curator (TC) divides the data domain into a L ×
L grid with an appropriate domain granularity L (e.g., one can
choose L such that one unit corresponds to a distance of one meter).
Then, using the range covering technique above, TC builds an
HXT-encrypted index for all objects. When a buyer initiates the
search process, a range query is performed as a series of conjunctive
keyword queries of length two (due to the 2D domain). If any term
evaluates to true for an object, the object matches the query.
Algorithm 1 shows the pseudocode to obtain covering nodes ids
for each object coordinate. Algorithm 2 shows how to generate the
object-keyword database DDB, which is subsequently encrypted
using HXT’s Setup procedure (Section 2). Setup outputs master
key mk, public parameters pub, and encrypted database EDB. Al-
gorithm 3 shows the pseudocode for answering encrypted spatial
range queries on top of EDB.
Algorithm 1 Get 1D Covering Nodes
Input: Domain length L; Position pos : 0 ≤ pos < L;
Output: Node ids covering position pos
node_ids← ∅
current_id ← ""
for i = logL to 0 do
append ith-bit of pos to current_id
node_ids = node_ids ∪ current_id
end for
return node_ids
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Figure 3: Mapping 1D domain using best range cover
Algorithm 2 Convert Object Locations
Input: Grid length L; Location database LDB where LDB[i] =
(xi ,yi ), ∀i : 0 ≤ xi ,yi < L;
Output: Document database DDB
for all object id i ∈ LDB do
x_words← Get 1D Covering Nodes of xi
y_words← Get 1D Covering Nodes of yi
for allw ∈ x_words do
DDB[i] = DDB[i] ∪ concatenate(′x ′,w)
end for
for allw ∈ y_words do
DDB[i] = DDB[i] ∪ concatenate(′y′,w)
end for
end for
return DDB
Algorithm 3 EncryptedSpatialRangeQuery
Input: Grid size L; EDB; range R; HXT parameters pub, mk
Output: Matched object identifiers
x_words← Get1DCover [R.bottom_rightx , R.top_leftx ]
y_words← Get1DCover [R.bottom_righty , R.top_lefty ]
matches← ∅
for all pairs kq = (wx ,wy ) ∈ x_words × y_words do
matches← matches ∪ HXTSearch(param, mk, kq, EDB)
end for
return matches
Limiting Query Size and Placement. With the proposed tech-
nique, a buyer can issue range queries of arbitrary size, shape, and
placement. Arbitrary queries are decomposed into a set of queries
that are precisely covered by a domain tree node, and a disjunctive
expression is formed, where each term is a conjunctive HXT query.
Such flexibility can decrease performance, since there may be nu-
merous sub-queries in the decomposition. In practice, query sizes
are likely to be small (e.g., no more than 1km2 within a city). In
addition, one can slightly restrict query placement, requiring that
a range aligns precisely with a tree node.
First, we consider limiting query size. Specifically, if query size
is limited to a maximum of L/2hmax in each dimension, then one
needs to consider only nodes up to a level hmax of the domain tree.
The larger hmax is, the fewer node levels are considered. Nodes at
higher levels (i.e., level < hmax) can be ignored when constructing
the keyword set for each object, resulting in smaller ciphertexts and
faster processing. Index creation time is also significantly boosted.
Second, we restrict queries to areas that are precisely covered
by one node of each tree. For example, for the 1D domain in Fig. 3,
although both ranges [3, 6] and [4, 7] have size 4, range [3, 6] is
covered exactly by three nodes (N3,N4,5,N6) while range [4, 7]
can be covered with a single node (N4,7). With this alignment
restriction, query decomposition is no longer necessary, and each
range query can be encoded as a single conjunctive keyword pair.
4.2 Asymmetric Encryption Search
The SSE approach described previously is quite efficient, but it
requires a trusted curator that has access to all plaintext locations
of advertised objects. This can lead to excessive disclosure, and in
some cases, it may be unrealistic to assume that system users are
willing to place so much trust in a centralized component. The HVE-
based approach described next uses asymmetric encryption and
allows object owners to encrypt locations by themselves. However,
this comes at additional performance overhead.
Previous work that focused on location-based queries on top
of HVE-encrypted data considered hierarchical or Gray encod-
ings [14]. In this context, each object location is snapped to a L × L
grid. An attribute vector is constructed for each object, which has
width l = 2 logL. Next, queries are expressed with respect to groups
of neighbor cells with similar encoded values. This may lead to
excessive computation time, given that the number of expensive
bilinear pairing operations required to evaluate a single token is
proportional to the HVE index vector width (as discussed in Sec-
tion 2). Furthermore, a range query in [14] often requires more than
a single token to evaluate, increasing computation time even more.
Another problem with using multiple tokens for a single query is
excessive leakage. To improve performance, the work in [14] uses
single-cell token aggregation and may end up with several tokens
for each query predicate, corresponding to sub-ranges of the query.
Based on the individual evaluation for each sub-query, an adversary
may pinpoint the object’s location to a smaller area than the actual
query of the buyer, which may result in significant privacy leakage.
We propose another approach of encoding range queries using
HVE. Essentially, our approach first transforms range queries to
keyword queries, using a domain mapping similar to the one used
for SSE. Then, HVE is used to assemble a ciphertext that allows
HVE evaluation of a conjunctive exact match query, one for each
spatial dimension. Recall from Section 2 that the elements of an
attribute vector can take values in Σ∗ = Zm ∪ {∗} for an integer
m < p,q. Also, a conjunctive formula of length two formed with
respect to node identifiers on Ox and Oy axes represents a 2D range.
For example, [N x2,3,N
y
4,5] indicates range [2, 3]×[4, 5] in 2D domain.
We utilize the domainmapping technique described in Section 4.1
to encode both the location of an object and a range query. Then,
for each coordinate of an object’s location, there are logL nodes
in the upward path from the leaf node of the coordinate to the
root. To capture all covering ranges on both coordinates, we would
need to capture within each ciphertext log2 L pairs of (x ,y) coordi-
nates. Even for moderate domain representation granularities (e.g.,
L = 65536, logL = 16), this would result in a significant storage
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Figure 4: Data and query encoding with HVE
overhead (e.g., 256 values for the logL = 16 setting). In addition
to the storage overhead, there is also increased processing time
when performing queries, since all pairs are potential candidates
for matching. To prevent performance deterioration, in the case
of HVE we choose to adopt a further query limitation compared
to SSE: specifically, we consider only query ranges with square
shape. These queries can still occur at each level of the domain tree,
but the range spans in each dimension are equal. As a result, we
only need to store logL pairs of encrypted coordinates in a HVE
ciphertext. In fact, when combined with the maximum query size
limit discussed for SSE, the overhead decreases to logL −hmax + 1.
Even with this additional constraint, buyers are still able to
formulate useful queries. If one considers the families of all reg-
ular grids with granularity increasing in powers of two super-
imposed on top of the data domain, then our encoding still allows a
query to express any possible cell within one of these grids. While
clearly more restrictive compared to arbitrary queries, the approach
achieves a good trade-off between flexibility and performance.
Fig. 4 exemplifies the modified encoding. For each object, the ids
of nodes in the domain binary tree on one dimension are combined
with the ids of nodes at the same level in the other dimension to
form for each ciphertext logL vectors of length one. Each vector
corresponds to a square area that is covered exactly by one node
of each tree. Range queries are also restricted in the same fashion,
i.e., a square area covered exactly by one node of each tree, to allow
conjunctive exact match evaluation. Thus, both the location of
an object and a range query are encoded as a single scalar value,
which can be used directly in the HVE matching phase. In our
implementation, the order of the node in a pre-order traversal of
the tree, identified by the path from the root to the leaf, is used as
the node identifier. Then, to ensure each area has a unique value,
the final value is calculated as N x ∗ 2 ∗ L + Ny where N x ,Ny are
the node ids of the object in the tree of Ox , Oy, respectively. For
instance, consider an object at location (3, 4) and a range query
[2, 3] × [4, 5]. As shown in Fig. 4, the location (3, 4) is covered by
nodes N0,3,N2,3,N3 in the tree of Ox and N4,7,N4,5,N4 in the tree
ofOy (the superscripts are omitted for simplicity). Hence, the ranges
covering the object are represented as the combinations of a node
in the tree of Ox and a node in the same level in the tree of Oy (e.g.
[N0,3 ∧ N4,7], [N2,3 ∧ N4,5], [N3 ∧ N5]). Then, these combinations
are transformed into length-two vectors using pre-order traversal
of the elements, which are [1, 8], [5, 9], [7, 10]. The final calculated
values for each case are [24], [89] and [122], respectively. The same
encoding is also applied to the range query, resulting in value [89].
Compared to the approach in [14] which results in HVE vec-
tors of length l = 2 logL, we generate length-one vectors, where
each vector is constructed from nodes of the same level in each
tree. Following the query size limitation, the size of the queries is
maximum L/2hmax in each dimension. When a buyer issues a query,
the resulting token generated by the TA must be compared with
all vectors of the ciphertext, and there is exactly one match if the
object is within the query range, and no matches if the object falls
outside the range. This results in maximum logL−hmax +1 evalua-
tions. With a simple modification, we can reduce this overhead to a
single evaluation, by also including the domain tree level within the
query. This way, the matching procedure only needs to evaluate the
token against the ciphertext at the same level as the one specified
in the query, reducing computational overhead of matching by a
factor of logL. Storage requirements for ciphertexts do not change,
since there could be a potential query received for any level of the
domain tree. We refer to this search variation as SingleLevel.
4.3 Owner Accountability and SPAM Resilience
Two major desiderata of our proposed system, accountability and
spam resilience, are achieved by storing for each advertised object
a digital commitment on the blockchain. Since write operations to
the chain are expensive, and the amount of information that can
be stored is small, it is crucial to reduce the size of commitment
strings, in order to reduce transaction costs. We employ the use of
vector commitments [7] which allow the commitment of a sequence
of values in a compact way (the length of the commitment string
is independent of the number of committed values). This way, an
owner can submit at the same time commitments for a batch of
objects and pay the on-chain write price for just one. The length of
a commitment is equal in size to that of an RSA encryption modulus
for a similar amount of security: in our implementation, we use
1024-bit commitments.
To advertise one or more objects, the owner creates a vector
digital commitment where each component corresponds to a loca-
tion. Locations are typically hashed, and then the commitment is
created by performing a modulo exponentiation operation with the
hashed value in a composite order group. The commitment vector
is published on the blockchain. Due to the difficulty of extracting
logarithms in the group, an adversary is not able to recover the
committed value, so location privacy for the owner is achieved. On
the other hand, the owner cannot later change the value of the
location without being detected, due to the binding property of
commitments. After a transaction is completed, if the buyer finds
that the actual location of the data object differs from the advertised
one, the on-chain commitment is sufficient to prove the owner’s
dishonesty and reverse the payment (additional penalties can be
imposed by the marketplace).
Spam-resilience is also achieved as a result of using the blockchain.
Due to the non-negligible cost of writing to the blockchain, it is
not economically viable for a dishonest party to advertise a large
number of objects. Various policies can be put in place to control the
trade-off between the cost per transaction incurred by legitimate
users, and the resilience to spam. For instance, one can enforce
a limit on the count of elements in vector commitments, which
in effect determines the number of objects that can be advertised
with a fixed cost (in the experimental evaluation of Section 5 we
measure the cost of writing a commitment to the chain in the order
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Figure 5: HXT index generation performance
of USD$0.02). In addition, the system can enforce a policy that man-
dates a deposit for each commitment. The deposit can be refunded
back to the owner after a transaction is completed, or after a pre-
defined time threshold. For example, if the cost is $0.02 to submit a
commitment for 20 objects (which translates to $1 for 1000 objects),
the system can enforce an additional deposit of $1 per commitment
(i.e., $50 for 1000 objects) refundable after one day. This policy can
be easily implemented through a smart contract.
Another policy that can be easily implemented as a smart con-
tract is to enforce a hard limit, e.g., 50 commitments per owner per
day. While the deposit requirement policy focuses on the financial
aspect, such a thresholding policy directly restricts the number of
commitments. Finally, when SSE is used, one can also enforce an
anti-spam mechanism at the TC, by limiting the number of objects
that are encrypted for each owner. Since the TC will not encrypt
more objects than the limit, the index size will be kept under control,
and search performance will not be affected.
5 EXPERIMENTAL EVALUATION
Experimental Settings. We evaluate the proposed approaches
using the SNAP project [30] location dataset, containing check-
ins of users in the Gowalla geo-social network. We assume that
owner objects’ geo-tags coincide with check-in locations. We se-
lect check-ins in the Los Angeles area, spanning latitude range
[33.6996, 34.3423] North and longitude range [118.6846, 118.1444]
West (an area of 3500km2 with a total of 110, 312 check-ins). We
randomly select from this set four object datasets D1,D2,D5 and
D10 having cardinality 10000, 20000, 50000 and 100000, respectively,
such that D1 ⊂ D2 ⊂ D5 ⊂ D10. The area is partitioned into a
L × L grid with granularity: G = logL = 10, 12, 14 and 16 (ranging
from 2300m2 down to less than 1m2 per cell). Object locations were
converted to keywords for HXT, and to length-two vectors for HVE.
Search requests of buyers were randomly generated by choosing an
anchor location from the dataset, then constructing a range around
it with three sizes: 400m × 550m, 800m × 1100m, and 1600m × 2200m,
ranging from 1% to 3.5% of data domain side length.
We implemented Python prototypes of the proposed approaches.
For HXT, we employed 1024-bit key length for pairing groups, while
for HVE we used the instantiation from [4] and varied key length
as 768, 1024, 1536 and 2048 bits. All experiments were run on a
Intel Core i7 3.60GHz CPU with 4 cores and 16GB RAM, running
Ubuntu 18.04. We used a single core for all experiments, except the
HVE parallel processing test for which we used all four available
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Figure 6: HXT query performance
cores. For blockchain tests, we built a private Ethereum network
using Go Ethereum version 1.8.20-stable.
SSEApproach Evaluation. First, wemeasure the HXT index build
time at the TC and the index size (Fig. 5). Each graph line corre-
sponds to a combination of granularity (L) and maximum tree levels
hmax . The index build time grows linearly with the number of ob-
jects. A finer granularity and a lower value of hmax increase the
build time, since they generate a larger number of keywords. For
the 50k cardinality the index creation time never exceeds 20 min-
utes, whereas in the worst case it takes 40 minutes for the 100k
case. For moderate granularity and height settings, build time is
below 10 minutes. The index size varies between 1 and 5.5GB.
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Figure 7: Analysis of query restriction effect
Fig. 6a shows the average query time for arbitrarily placed
queries. The performance overhead is considerably higher for the
queries with larger span and is less influenced by granularity. In the
worst case, a query takes 12sec , and if we exclude the largest query
range, less than 6sec for 100k objects. Fig. 6b shows the results
when restricting query placement. Clearly, there is a significant
gain in performance, resulting in a query time reduction between
2.5 and 8 times. The query time is always below 4sec . To better
understand the performance gain due to query restrictions, we
measure the count of individual conjunctive queries resulting from
the decomposition of arbitrary ranges (Fig. 7a). A single range may
be decomposed into as many as 120 conjunctive HXT queries, and
the number of such queries increases with G . As a result, there is a
much higher number of documents in the database containing the
first keywords (DB(w1)). Fig. 7b shows the cardinality of DB(w1),
which increases significantly with the span of the query range.
HVE Approach Evaluation.With HVE, owners encrypt data by
themselves, hence security is improved since locations are not
shared with a trusted entity. However, the owner’s device may have
less computational power, so we must ensure the client overhead
is low. Fig. 8 shows the HVE ciphertext generation time and size.
Current security guidelines specify 1024-bit protection as sufficient
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Figure 8: HVE encryption time and ciphertext size per object
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Figure 9: HVE matching time per ciphertext
for individual data; in this setting, encryption time is usually be-
low 5sec . Even for higher security requirements, encryption never
exceeds 40sec . Ciphertext size is under 30KB.
Key size 768 1024 1536 2048
Generation time (s) 0.019 0.036 0.085 0.165
Size (bytes) 402 534 786 1050
Table 1: HVE token generation time and size
Table 1 shows the token generation time at the TA. Token gen-
eration time is short, 0.2sec in the worst case. Token size of is also
negligible (at most 1KB). The results justify our claim that there is
a strong business case for TAs (e.g., cell operators) to participate in
the system: the overhead is small, and no significant infrastructure
investment is necessary to support such a service.
The most significant performance concern with HVE is the query
time, due to the use of expensive bilinear pairing operations. Fig. 9
shows query time (i.e., HVEmatch) per token/ciphertext pair. Query
time for 1024-bit security, G = 12 (approximately 10 meters per
grid cell side) and query size is limited to hmax = 6, is 370msec , and
reaching close to 6sec for higher security requirements (i.e. key size
= 2048), larger G = 16, and no query size limit (i.e. hmax = 0). With
the SingleLevel optimization (Section 4.2), the query time is reduced
to under 52msec . This is still significant though, considering that
the marketplace may have millions of objects.
HVE is also expensive due to the absence of an index: every
ciphertext is matched against the token. However, the search is
embarrassingly parallel. One can distribute the ciphertexts over
many nodes and achieve near-linear speedup. Since token size is
small, it can easily be broadcast at query time to many nodes. Each
Swarm node can perform the matching itself, and charge the buyer
for the compute cycles. Table 2 shows parallel execution time when
running HVE search for 10000 objects on four cores, key size 1024
bits, G = 16, and hmax = 7, with the SingleLevel optimization.
The speedup obtained is linear. Assuming linear speedup, using
100 cores one could execute the query for a database of 10, 000
objects in 10 seconds. Using a conservative cost estimation from
cloud providers, this translates to a financial cost $0.03/query, easily
absorbed in the cost of a single marketplace transaction.
#processes 1 2 3 4
Query time (s) 525 332 221 170
Speedup 1 1.6 2.4 3.1
Table 2: Parallel execution speedup for HVE matching
Financial Cost Evaluation. Our aim is to prove the financial via-
bility of the proposed marketplace, by showing it represents only
a small percentage of transaction cost. Financial cost includes the
cost of writing to blockchain, and the cost of storage (index and
metadata). We omit commitment computation time (which was
under 0.2sec).For blockchain operations, we measure both the gas
and USD amount (at the rate of 1ether = $133).
On-chain operation Gas Cost ($)
Owner registration 42150 0.02
Owner sets commitment public params 327590 0.10
TA/TC submits SSE/HVE index/file info 177160 0.06
Table 3: On-chain cost of one-time, setup operations
Table 3 shows the one-time set-up cost when joining the mar-
ketplace. This includes owner registration, owner setting up public
parameters for digital commitments, and TA/TC submitting boot-
strap information about SSE index or HVE flat file. We use 1024 key
size for digital commitments; the message space of each commit-
ment is 64 bits (32 bits for each coordinate). The total set-up cost
for each owner is about $0.12, and for each TA in the HVE-based
marketplace is $0.06.
On-chain operation Gas Cost ($)
Owner submits commitment 83092 0.02
Buyer makes an offer 297478 0.08
Owner withdraws payment 40649 0.01
Table 4: On-chain cost breakdown for every transaction
Table 4 shows the cost of on-chain operations for an end-to-end
purchase transaction between owner and buyer: an owner submits
commitments for locations of her objects; a buyer makes an offer to
purchase objects; and optionally, the buyer withdraws his payment
in case of discovering a fraudulent advertisement although this last
step rarely occurs. The total cost for a purchase is approximately
$0.11. This is a relatively low cost: considering an average of $10
price per purchase, this represents a 1.1% fee.
6 RELATEDWORK
Blockchain has been adopted in many areas such as healthcare [17,
22], Internet of Things [12, 21], smart vehicles [19, 24], real-world
asset trading [28], finance [16], or logistics [9]. ModelChain [22] is a
decentralized framework for privacy-preserving healthcare predic-
tive modeling based on a private blockchain. CreditCoin [24] uses
the blockchain and threshold ring signatures to achieve anonymity
for smart vehicles. The work in [17] proposed a blockchain-based
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location sharing scheme for telecare medical information systems.
However, in their system, locations are encrypted using an order-
preserving encryption scheme, which is known to incur significant
leakage. Closer to our work, [19] uses the blockchain-based model
to protect locations of smart vehicles; however, their privacy model
relies on random identifiers and enlargement of reported areas
providing only ad-hoc protection, as opposed to our solution that
inherits the strong protection of encryption. In the context of data
exchange and marketplaces for location data using blockchain, [36]
proposed a system based on conventional encryption, which does
not support search on ciphertexts. Fysical [26] is a blockchain-
based marketplace where suppliers can sell plaintext or aggregated
location data, which raises serious privacy issues.
There are some important lines of works orthogonal to our ap-
proach. One direction focuses on creating proofs of location using
blockchain [1, 5, 13, 25]. The recently-proposed Hawk [20] system
is a blockchain model that provides transactional privacy such that
private bids and financial data are hidden from public view. Zhang
et. al [35] proposed GEM2-tree for authenticated range queries
with off-chain storage. Such approaches can be integrated into our
system to allow validation of the geo-tags, hiding transactions, or
validate results from our searchable encrypted indices.
7 CONCLUSION
We proposed a blockchain-based privacy-preserving, accountable
and spam-resilient marketplace for geospatial data which allows
owners and buyers to be matched using only encrypted location
information. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first approach
to achieve these important desiderata. In future work, we will in-
vestigate architectures that eliminate the need for trusted entities
or reduce the amount of information that is made available to such
entities. In addition, we will explore alternative data encodings and
encrypted processing techniques to further reduce system overhead.
We will also investigate how our results can be extended to other
types of data, not only geo-spatial attributes.
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